Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have many potential applications [1, 5] 
INTRODUCTION
Advances in wireless communications have enabled the development of low-cost and lowpower wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1] . WSNs have many potential applications [1, 5] and unique challenges. They usually are heterogeneous systems contain many small devices, called sensor nodes, that monitoring different environments in cooperative; i.e. sensors cooperate to each other and compose their local data to reach a global view of the environment; sensor nodes also can operate autonomously. In WSNs there are two other components, called "aggregation points" and "base stations" [3] , which have more powerful resources than normal sensors. Aggregation points collect information from their nearby sensors, integrate them and then forward to the base stations to process gathered data, as shown in figure1. limitations such as cost, invisible deployment and variety application domains, lead to requiring small size and limited resources (like energy, storage and processing) sensors [2] . Also, WSNs are vulnerable to many types of attacks and due to unsafe and unprotected nature of communication channel [4, 9, 22] , untrusted and broadcast transmission media, deployment in hostile environments [1, 5] , automated nature and limited resources, the most of security techniques of traditional networks are impossible in WSNs; therefore, security is a vital and complex requirement for these networks. It is necessary to design an appropriate security mechanism for these networks [5, 6] , which attending to be WSN's constraints. This security mechanism should cover different security dimension of WSNs, include confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity. The main purpose of this paper is presenting an overview of different link layer attacks on WSNs and comparing them together. In this paper, we focus on security of WSNs and classify it into four categories, as follows:
• An overview of WSNs, • Security in WSNs include security goals, security obstacles and security requirements of WSNs, • The threat model on WSNs, • A wide variety of WSN's link layer attacks and comparison them to each other, include classification of WSN's link layer attacks based on threat model and compare them to each other based on their goals, results, strategies, detection and defensive mechanisms; This work makes us enable to identify the purpose and capabilities of the attackers; also, the goal, final result and effects of the attacks on the WSNs. We also state some available approaches of security detection and defensive mechanisms against these attacks to handle them. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 is presented an overview of WSNs; while section 3 focused on security in WSNs and presents a diagram about it; section 4 considers the threat model in WSNs; section 5 includes definitions, strategies and effects of link layer attacks on WSNs; in section 6 is considered WSNs' link layer attacks, their goals, effects, possible detection and defensive mechanisms, and extracts their different features, then classifies the link layer attacks based on extracted features and compares them to each other; and finally, in section 7, we present our conclusion. 
OVERVIEW OF WSNS
In this section, we present an outline of different dimensions of WSNs, such as definition, characteristics, applications, constraints and challenges; as presented in following subsections (subsection 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4).
Definition and suppositions of WSNs
A WSN is a heterogeneous system consists of hundreds or thousands low-cost and low-power tiny sensors to monitoring and gathering information from deployment environment in real-time [6, 7, 8] . Common functions of WSNs are including broadcast and multicast, routing, forwarding and route maintenance. The sensor's components are: sensor unit, processing unit, storage/memory unit, power supply unit and wireless radio transceiver; these units are communicating to each other, as shown in following figure (figure2). The existing components on WSN's architecture are including sensor nodes (motes or field devices that are sensing data), network manager, security manager, aggregation points, base stations (access point or gateway) and user/human interface. Besides, there are two approaches in WSN's communication models containing hierarchical WSN versus distributed [6] and homogeneous WSN versus heterogeneous [6] . Some of common suppositions of these networks are:
• Insecure radio links [8, 9, 10] , • Packet injection and replay [8, 9] , • Non tamper resistant [10] , • Many normal sensor nodes (high-density) and low malicious nodes, • Powerful attackers (laptop-class) [10, 20] . 
WSNs characteristics and weakness
Most important characteristics of WSNs are including:
• Constant or mobile sensors (mobility), • Sensor limited resources [4, 18] (limited range radio communication, energy, computational capabilities [4] ), low reliability, wireless communication [4] and immunity, • Dynamic/unpredictable WSN's topology and self-organization [4, 21] , • Ad-hoc based networks [8, 19] and hop-by-hop communication (multi-hop routing) [11, 12, 21] , • Non-central management, autonomously and infrastructure-less [8] ,
• Open/hostile-environment nature [8, 10] and high density;
WSN's applications
In general, there are two kinds of applications for WSNs including, monitoring and tracking [8] ; therefore, some of most common applications of these networks are: military, medical, environmental monitoring [2, 6, 8] , industrial, infrastructure protection [2, 8] , disaster detection and recovery, agriculture, intelligent buildings, law enforcement, transportation and space discovery (as shown in figure3: a and b). 
Vulnerabilities and challenges of WSNs
WSNs are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks; some of most important reasons are including:
• Theft (reengineering, compromising and replicating), • Limited capabilities [13, 14] (DoS attacks risks, constraint in using encryption), • Random deployment (hard pre-configuration) [13, 22] , • Unattended nature [13, 19, 21, 22] ; In continue this section states most common challenges and constraints in WSNs; include:
• Deployment on open/dynamic/hostile environments [19, 20, 22] [19, 20] (dynamic structure and topology, self-organization);
• Resource scarcity/hungry [4, 17, 22] (low and expensive communication/computation/processing resources); • Immense/large scale (high density, scalable security mechanism requirement);
• Unreliable communication [4, 22] (connectionless packet-based routing unreliable transfer, channel broadcast nature conflicts, multi-hop routing and network congestion and node processing Latency);
• Unattended operation [9, 20] (Exposure of physical attacks, managed remotely, no central management point); • Redesigning security architectures (distributed and self-organized);
• Increased attacks' risks and vulnerabilities [22] , new attacks, increased tiny/embedded devices, multi-hopping routing (selfish) [21] ; • Devices with limited capabilities [15, 16] , pervasiveness (privacy worries), wireless (medium) [4, 13, 22] and mobility;
SECURITY IN WSNS
Now, intrusion techniques in WSNs are growth; also there are many methods to disrupt these networks. In WSNs, data accuracy and network health are necessary; because these networks usually use on confidential and sensitive environments. There are three security key points on WSNs, including system (integrity, availability), source (authentication, authorization) and data (integrity, confidentiality). Necessities of security in WSNs are:
• Correctness of network functionality;
• Unusable typical networks protocols [2, 19] ;
• Limited resources [4, 22, 24] ;
• Untrusted nodes [4, 19, 20] ;
• Requiring trusted center for key management [19] , to authenticating nodes to each other [25] , preventing from existing attacks and selfishness [24, 26] and extending collaboration;
Why security in WSNs?
Security in WSNs is an important, critical issue, necessary and vital requirement, due to:
• WSNs are vulnerable against security attacks [22, 23] (broadcast and wireless nature of transmission medium); • Nodes deploy on hostile environments [19, 20, 22] (unsafe physically);
• Unattended nature of WSNs [9, 20] 
Security issues
This section states the most important discussions on WSNs; it is including key establishment, secrecy, authentication, privacy, robustness to DoS attacks, secure routing and node capture [13, 19] ;
Security services
There are many security services on WSNs; but some of their common are including encryption and data link layer authentication [17, 19, 20, 24] , multi-path routing [19, 21, 24, 25] , identity verification, bidirectional link verification [19, 21, 25] and authenticated broadcasts.
Security protocols
This section presents the most common security protocols of WSNs, containing:
• SNEP: Secure network encryption protocol (secure channels for confidentiality, integrity by using authentication, freshness); • µTESLA [6, 19] (Micro timed, efficient, streaming, loss-tolerant authentication protocol, authentication by using asymmetric authenticated broadcast); • SPIN (Sensor protocols for information via negotiation): The idea behind SPIN is to name the data using high-level descriptors or meta-data. Before transmission, metadata are exchanged among sensors via a data advertisement mechanism, which is the key feature of SPIN. Each node upon receiving new data, advertises it to its neighbors and interested neighbors, i.e. those who do not have the data, retrieve the data by sending a request message. There is no standard meta-data format and it is assumed to be application specific.
There are three messages defined in SPIN to exchange data between nodes, include: ADV message to allow a sensor to advertise a particular meta-data, REQ message to request the specific data and DATA message that carry the actual data [11, 21] ; • Broadcasts of end-to-end encrypted packets [24, 25] (authentication, integrity, confidentiality, replay);
As figure4 shows, the most important dimensions of security in WSNs are including security goals, obstacles, constraints, security threats, security mechanisms and security classes; however, this paper considers only star spangled parts/blocks to classify and compare WSNs' link layer attacks based on them; i.e. security threats (including availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality) and security classes (containing interruption, interception, modification and fabrication); as shown in table3. 
Attacks based on damage/access level
In this subsection is presented the classifications of WSNs' link layer attacks based on their damage level or attacker's access level, including:
4.1.1. Active attacker: this kind of attacker does operations, such as:
• Injecting faulty data into the WSN;
• Impersonating [2, 8] ;
• Packet modification [19] ; • Unauthorized access, monitor, eavesdrop and modify resources and data stream;
• Creating hole in security protocols [20] ;
• Overloading the WSN;
Some of most goals and effects of these attacks are:
• The WSN functionality disruption;
• The WSN performance degradation;
• Sensor nodes destruction;
• Data alteration;
• Inability in use the WSN's services;
• Obstructing the operations or to cut off certain nodes from their neighbors;
Passive attacker: passive attacker may do following functions;
• Attacker is similar to a normal node and gathers information from the WSN;
• Monitoring and eavesdropping [2, 20] from communication channel by unauthorized attackers; • Naturally against privacy; The goals and effects of this kind of attacker include:
• Eavesdropping, gathering and stealing information;
• Compromised privacy and confidentiality requirements; • Storing energy by selfish node and to avoid from cooperation;
• The WSN functionality degradation;
• Network partition by non-cooperate in operations;
Attacks based on attacker location
Attacker can be deployed inside or outside the WSN; if the attacker be into the WSN's range, called insider (internal), and if the attacker is deployed out of the WSN's range, called outsider (external). This subsection presented and classified the WSNs' link layer attacks based on attackers' location, including:
External attacker (outsider):
some of the most common features of this type of attacks are:
• External to the network [2, 19] (from out of the WSN range);
• Device: Mote/Laptop class;
• Committed by illegally parties [2, 7] ; • Initiating attacks without even being authenticated; Some of common effects of these attacks are including:
• Jamming the entire communication of the WSN; • WSN's resources consumption;
• Triggering DoS attacks;
Internal attacker (insider): the meaning of insider attacker is:
• Main challenge in WSNs;
• Sourced from inside of the WSN and access to all other nodes within its range [2, 5, 7] ; • Authorized node in the WSN is malicious/compromised;
• Executing malicious data or use of cryptography contents of the legitimate nodes [19, 20] ;
• Legitimate entity (authenticated) compromising a number of WSN's nodes; Some of most important goals of these attacks type are:
• Access to cryptography keys or other WSN codes;
• Revealing secret keys;
• A high threat to the functional efficiency of the whole collective;
• Partial/total degradation/disruption;
Attacks based on attacking devices
Attackers can use different types of devices to attack to the WSNs; these devices have different power, radio antenna and other capabilities. There are two common categories of them, including:
4.3.1. Mote-class attacker: mote-class attacker is every one that using devices similar to common sensor nodes; this means,
• Occurring from inside the WSN;
• Using WSN's nodes (compromised sensor nodes) or access to similar nodes/motes (which have similar functionality as the WSN's nodes) [7, 8] ; • Executing malicious codes/programs; Mote-class attacker has many goals, such as:
• Jamming radio link;
• Stealing and access to cryptography keys;
Laptop-class attacker:
laptop-class attacker is every one that using more powerful devices than common sensor nodes, including:
• Using more powerful devices by attacker, thus access to high bandwidth and low-latency communication channel; • Traffic injection [2] ; • Passive eavesdrop [19] on the entire WSN by a single laptop-class device;
• Replacing legitimate nodes; Laptop-class attackers have many effects on WSNs, for example:
• Launching more serious attacks and then lead to more serious damage; • Jamming radio links on the WSN entirely (by using more powerful transmitter); • Access to high bandwidth and low-latency communication channel;
Attacks based on function (operation)
Link layer attacks in WSNs have been classified into three types, based on their main functionality; this subsection presented them, include:
Secrecy: its definition and techniques are:
• Operating stealthy on the communication channel;
• Eavesdropping [4, 20] ;
• Packet replay, spoofing or modification;
• Injecting false data into the WSN [5, 6] ;
• Cryptography standard techniques can prevent from these attacks; Goals and effects of this kind of attacks are:
• Passive eavesdrop;
• Packet replication, spoofing or modification; 4.4.2. Availability: this class of attacks known as Denial of Services (DoS) attacks; which leads to WSNs' unavailability, degrade the WSNs' performance or broken it. Some of the most common goals and effects of this attacks' category are including:
• Performance degradation;
• The WSN's services destruction/disruption; • The WSN useless/unavailable; 4.4.3. Stealthy: this kind of attacks is operating stealthy on the communication channel; such as:
• False data injection into the WSN; The most important effects of these attacks are including:
• Partial/entire degradation/disruption the WSN's services and functionality; As shown in table1, damage level of link layer attacks on WSNs can be high (serious effect on the WSN) or low (limited effect on the WSN); besides, the attackers identification can be easy (possible), medium or hard (impossible), depending on that kind of attack; also the attackers' presence or attacks' effects can be explicit (serious damage) or implicit (for example, eavesdropping).
DEFINITIONS, STRATEGIES AND EFFECTS OF LINK LAYER ATTACKS ON WSNS
WSNs are designed in layered form; this layered architecture makes these networks susceptible and lead to damage against many kinds of attacks. For each layer, there are some attacks and defensive mechanisms. Thus, WSNs are vulnerable against different link layer attacks, such as DoS attacks, Collision, unfairness and other attacks to link layer protocols [2, 19] ; WSNs are susceptible to link layer attacks. Attackers can gain access to transmission media, create radio interference, prevent from legitimate sensor nodes to communicate/transmit (access to the communication channel) or launch DoS attacks against link layer. Now, in table2 is presented the definitions of link layer attacks on WSNs, and then it classified and compared them to each others based on their strategies and effects. • Physically 4 ;
• Logical 5 ;
• Stop nodes' services;
• Take over/compromise the partial/entire the WSN and prevent from some communication;
• Impossibility reading gathered information;
• Launching other attacks;
Link layer jamming
• Finding data packet and to jam it [1] ;
• Looking at the probability distribution of the inter-arrival times between all types of packets;
• This attack can be applied on S-MAC, B-MAC and L-MAC protocols [1] ;
• Colliding packets during transmission;
• Exhausting nodes' resources;
• Confusion;
Collision
• Message transmission by two nodes on a same frequency [1, 4] , simultaneously;
• There are 2 types collision: environmental and probabilistic collision;
• Environmental collision;
• Probabilistic collision;
• Verifying and isolate radio transmissions;
• Change packet's fields;
• Alter the ack message;
• 4 capture and physically damage stop functionality; 5 using other attacks such as collision or exhaustion or unfairness node's resources exhaustion stop node's functionality; 6 Continuously retransmit out-of-date/dead/corrupted packets; 7 Create noise/parasite/interference in acknowledgment messages;
Unfairness
• Partial DoS attack 8 ;
• Using other attacks such as collision and exhaustion continuously;
• Intermittent application of collision and exhaustion attacks;
• Misusing/abusing a cooperative MAC-layer priority mechanism;
• Continuously request to access to channel by attacker 9 ;
• Decrease utility and efficiency of services;
• Nodes' hungry to channel access;
• Limiting access to channel and undermine communication channel capacity;
• Acknowledge spoofing
• An adversary can spoof link layer acknowledgements (ACKs) of overheard packets [10] ;
• ACKs replication;
• Forging/spoofing link layer ACKs of neighbor nodes;
• False view/information of the WSN;
• Launch selective forwarding attack;
• Packet loss/corruption;
Sinkhole
• A special selective forwarding attack;
• More complex than blackhole attack;
• Attracting [4, 9] or draw the all possible network traffic to a compromised node by placing a malicious node closer to the base station [12] 
Desynchronization
• Disrupting the established connections between two legitimate nodes by resynchronizing their transmission 13 ;
• Sending repeatedly forged or false messages;
• Re-synchronizing transmissions;
• Disrupt communication;
• Go out the synchronization;
• Resource exhaustion;
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
• A general attack includes several types other attacks in different layers of WSN, simultaneously [28] ;
• Reducing the WSN's availability [19, 28] ;
• Physical layer, link layer, routing layer, transport layer and application layer attacks techniques;
• Effects of physical layer, link layer, routing layer, transport layer and application layer attacks;
COMPARISON LINK LAYER ATTACKS ON WSNS
WSNs are vulnerable against link layer attacks. Therefore, we have to use some techniques to protect data accuracy, network functionality and its availability. As a result, we require establishing security in WSNs with attention to requirements and limitations of these networks.
Link layer attacks classification based on threat model of WSNs
In this subsection, we have tried to compare the link layer attacks of WSNs based on attacks' nature and effects, attackers' nature and capabilities, and WSN's threat model; as shown in following table (table3). Table3 shows the most important known attacks on WSNs; this table has three columns, including security class, attack threat and WSNs' threat model. Our purpose of security class is the nature of attacks, includes interruption, interception, modification and fabrication. Attack threat shows which security service attacked or security dimension affected, includes confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. The threat model of WSNs has three subcolumns, that they are presenting attackers' features and capabilities, including based on attacker location (internal/insider or external/outsider), based on attacking devices (mote-class or laptopclass) and based on attacks on WSN's protocols, include active attacks and passive attacks; active attacks are targeting availability (packet drop or resource consumption), integrity (information modification) and authenticity (fabrication); passive attacks are aiming confidentiality (interception). Following figure (figure5) shows the nature of WSN's link layer attacks; it compares these attacks based on their nature by presents the percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks which based on interruption, interception, modification or/and fabrication; as a result, the nature of the most of these attacks is modification (almost 85 percent of them).
14 Security class: the nature of attacks; include interruption, interception, modification and fabrication; 15 Attack threat: security service attacked; threaten/affected security dimension; include confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability; 16 Threat model: based on attacker location or access level (internal/insider or external/outsider), based on attacking devices (moteclass or laptop-class) and based on damage/attacks on WSN protocols include active attacks (availability (packet drop or resource consumption), integrity (information modification) and authenticity (fabrication)), passive attacks (confidentiality (interception)); Following diagram (figure6) shows a comparison of WSNs' link layer attacks based on their security threats factors including confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability, in percentage; for example, it presents almost 31 percent of security threat of WSNs' link layer attacks is confidentiality and the nature of 38.4 percent of them is fabrication (fabricating data or identity). As shown in figure6, the aim of the most WSNs' link layer attacks is attacking integrity and availability. 
Link layer attacks comparison based on their goals and results
In link layer, attacker can disrupt the WSN's functionality by tampering with link layer services such as modifying MAC (Media Access Control) protocol, interference in communication channel and replicating/altering data frames. As shown in table4, it categorizes the link layer attacks of WSNs, based on their goals, effects and results. Also table4 compares WSNs' link layer attacks based on attack or attacker purpose (including passive eavesdrop, disrupt communication, unfairness, authorization and authentication), requirements technical capabilities (such as radio, battery, powerful receiver/antenna and other high-tech and strong attacking devices), vulnerabilities, main target and final result of attacks. Besides, the contributors of all following link layer attacks (shown in table4) are one or many compromised motes, pc or laptop devices on WSNs. The vulnerabilities of these attacks can be physical (hardware), logical or their both; Attacks' main target may be physical (hardware), logical (lis: logical-internal services or lps: logical-provided services) or their both. Final result of these attacks is including passive damage, partial degradation of the WSN functionality and total broken of the WSN's services or functionality. Following figure (figure8) shows that how much percentage of WSNs' link layer attacks are happened by targeting the fairness, confidentiality, authentication, authorization and disrupt communication on WSNs' functionalities, services and resources; for example, almost 85 percent of these attacks are aiming the fairness of WSNs, and then they lead to unfairness. 
Detection and defensive strategies of WSNs' link layer attacks
In following table (table5) a classification and comparison of detection and defensive techniques on WSNs' link layer attacks is presented. 
Node outage
• Node disconnection from the network;
• Regular monitoring and nodes' cooperation;
• Existence interference in common operation of node;
• Node destruction (physically);
• Providing an alternative path;
• Developing appropriate and robust protocols;
• Defensive mechanisms against physical and node capture attacks 23 ;
Link layer jamming • Misbehavior detection techniques 24 ;
• False identity detection techniques;
• Limiting the rate of MAC requests;
• Use of small frames;
• S-MAC defensive method [1] 25 ;
• L-MAC defensive method [1] 26 ;
• B-MAC defensive method [1] 27 ;
• Identity protection 28 ;
• Link layer encryption;
Collision
• Misbehavior detection techniques;
• All countermeasures of jamming attack;
• Error correction codes (such as CRC codes) [1] ;
• Time diversity; 23 Using tamper-proofing/tamper-resistant sensor packages; using special alerting hardware/software to the user; camouflaging/hiding sensors; 24 include adjustment back-off values, watchdogs/IDS on every node, iterative probing mechanisms, game theory, misbehaviorresilient back-off algorithm, and rating nodes based on replication rate or node's cooperation in communication; 25 preventing clustering based analysis by narrowing the distance between the two clusters; 26 making the estimation of the clusters more difficult by changing the slot sizes (used for packet transmission) pseudo-randomly as a function of time; 27 shortening the preamble in order to make its detection harder; 28 using cryptography-based authentication or false identity detection techniques such as Radio resource test (Sybil attack), position verification (detecting immobile attackers), code attestation (differing executing code on malicious or compromised node rather than normal nodes detecting attackers by validating executing code on nodes), sequence checking and identity association (associating node identity with used keys on communication by that node);
Resource Exhaustion
• • Combinational methods (such as radio waves and ultrasound);
• Authentication, link layer encryption and global shared key techniques;
De-synchronization • Strong and un-forgeable authentication mechanisms;
• Strong authentication mechanisms 34 ;
• Time synchronization, cooperatively 35 ;
• Maintaining proper timing;
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
• Detection methods of physical layer, link layer, routing layer, transport layer and application layer attacks;
• Defensive mechanisms of physical layer, link layer, routing layer, transport layer and application layer attacks; • Link layer encryption and authentication mechanisms can protect against outsiders, moteclass attackers and link layer attacks such as link layer jamming, traffic manipulation and acknowledgement spoofing; • Encryption is not enough and inefficient for inside attacks and laptop-class attackers; but clustering protocols can provide most secure solutions against inside attacks and compromised nodes; • The link layer attacks are often launching combinational; 32 suspicious node detection by signal strength; a proactive routing protocol based on the hierarchical tree construction; 33 Using tight clock synchronization, but unfeasible for the majority of WSNs; 34 to control the identity and the integrity of packets; exchanging packets that are authenticated (including all control fields in the transport protocol header); 35 Using different neighbors for time synchronization;
CONCLUSION
• The different kinds of link layer attacks may be used same strategies;
• The same type of defensive mechanisms can be used in multiple link layer attacks, such as misbehavior detection; • The accuracy of solutions against link layer attacks depends on the characteristics of the WSN's application domain; • As presented in table6, 84.6 percent of link layer attacks' nature is modification; 30.7 percent of link layer attacks threaten confidentiality, etc; • As shown in figure10, the nature of 84.6 percent of WSNs' link layer attacks is modification; 76.9 percent of them are targeting integrity and availability; most of these attacks are out of the WSNs' range (external: 100 percent) and lead to high-level damages (active attacks: 92.3 percent); 84.6 percent of attacks' purpose is unfairness; 92.3 percent of link layer attacks' main target is WSNs' logical provided services;
This work makes us enable to identify the purpose and capabilities of the attackers; also the goal, final result and effects of the attacks on the WSNs' functionality. The next step of our work is considering other attacks on WSNs. We hope by reading this paper, readers can have a better view of link layer attacks and aware from some defensive techniques against them; as a result, they can take better and more extensive security mechanisms to design secure WSNs. • Optimizing existing WSNs' MAC protocols;
